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INTRODUCTION
The grant of patents is one of Congress's most particularly
important and special powers. This power is one of Congress's
specifically enumerated powers1 and enjoys a particularly long and
established history in the United States. The first U.S. patent
statute was passed in April 17902 by the First Congress, and the
first patent was issued shortly thereafter.3 A patent gives the
patentee the exclusive right to exclude others from making, selling,
or using the patented invention within the United States.4 Those
who violate any of these rights are considered direct infringers.5 The
patent statutes also expose some people who indirectly infringe a
patent to liability. In modern terms, indirect liability is divided into
two categories: active inducement to infringe patents6 and contribu-
tory infringement.7
In two opinions decided three months apart, Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.8 and Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
Systems, Inc.,9 the Federal Circuit espoused two seemingly contrast-
ing views of what kind of knowledge and intent is required to hold
someone liable for having actively induced another to infringe a
patent. Generally speaking, commentators and courts have inter-
preted these cases as holding either that a finding of active induce-
ment to infringe a patent requires a showing of general intent to
cause acts that constitute infringement or that such a finding
requires a showing of specific intent to purposefully cause infringing
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ('The Congress shall have Power ... to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .....
2. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
3. The inventor, Samuel Hopkins, received the patent on a process for making potash
from wood ashes. See U.S. Patent No. 1 (issued July 31, 1790), available at
http://www.patentstation.com/pic/pdfdlUSOXO000001.pdf; Henry M. Paynter, The First
Patent, http://www.me.utexas.edu-lotario/paynter/hmp/TheFirstPatent.html (last visited
Dec. 20, 2006).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
5. See id. § 271(a).
6. Id. § 271(b).
7. Id. § 271(c).
8. 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (decided July 30, 1990).
9. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (decided Oct. 23, 1990).
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acts. District courts have been overwhelmingly inconsistent in
interpreting the Federal Circuit's intent, commentators have noted
a lack of clarity, and even the Federal Circuit itself has split into
two seemingly contradictory lines of cases. The uncertainty in this
aspect of patent law is problematic for patentees, those who wish to
avoid infringement, and practitioners who advise both patentees
and potential indirect infringers. This situation is particularly
troublesome for corporate officers: they undoubtedly intend to cause
their corporations to act, but not every corporate officer intends for
his corporation to infringe. The muddled state of active inducement
jurisprudence provides no guide for how such officers should direct
their companies and can paralyze innovation.
This Note argues, ultimately, that this seeming schism is, in fact,
illusory and the result of a widespread misreading of the relevant
case law. Part I discusses those aspects of § 271(b) active induce-
ment law that are well-settled before the Federal Circuit. Part II
discusses the two cases central to this controversy, Hewlett-Packard
and Manville, in great detail to explain how they have been misread
by some courts and some commentators. Part III discusses how the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,10 a copyright case in which the Supreme Court
explicitly incorporated the active inducement standard from
patent law into copyright law, may serve as a useful window to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the scienter requirement for
active inducement. Part IV discusses how this Note's understanding
of the case law comports with the common law underlying the
development of the doctrines of active inducement and contributory
infringement in the patent law, discusses the legislative history of
the Patent Act, and addresses some criticisms of the standard this
Note proposes.
10. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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I. WELL-SETTLED ACTIVE INDUCEMENT LAW
The doctrines of indirect infringement1' are intended to punish
those whose actions, though they do not constitute direct infringe-
ment, are inequitable and run counter to the purpose of the patent
laws. Courts have long recognized that "[t]he statutory liability for
inducement of infringement derives from the common law, wherein
acts that the actor knows will lead to the commission of a wrong by
another, place shared liability for the wrong on the actor."'2
The common law principles codified in § 271(b) most closely
resemble tort and criminal law principles of aiding and abetting or
accessory before the fact. This analogy between the common law
and statutory active inducement has been recognized by Congress,13
esteemed contemporary patent scholars," and courts of appeals
decisions after the 1952 Patent Act and before the creation of
the Federal Circuit."5 Though both aiding and abetting (in a tort
context) and accessory before the fact (in a criminal context)
theories of liability involve assigning so-called "indirect" liability,
they are not truly inchoate offenses like solicitation; one cannot be
said to have aided and abetted or been an accessory before the fact
if no actual or direct tort or crime occurs.'6 Following this reasoning,
courts have consistently held that there can be no active inducement
to infringe when there is no evidence of an underlying direct
11. This Note is primarily concerned with active inducement as statutorily established
by § 271(b). Contributory infringement established by § 271(c), except where tangentially
related, and in historical contexts, is outside the scope of this Note. For a detailed history of
the development of the doctrine of contributory infringement, see Tom Arnold & Louis Riley,
Contributory Infringement and Patent Misuse: The Enactment of § 271 and its Subsequent
Amendments, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SocY 357 (1994). See generally 5 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 17.01-.05 (Supp. 2005).
12. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) ("Paragraph (b) recites in broad terms that one
who aids and abets an infringement is likewise an infringer.").
14. See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT.
OFF. SoC'Y 476, 491-92 (1953) (referring to active inducers of infringement as "joint
infringers') (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See Sims v. W. Steel Co., 551 F.2d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 1977) ('This subsection
contemplates that the inducer shall have been an active participant in the line of conduct of
which the actual infringer was guilty. Thus he should be in the nature of an accessory before
the fact.").
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875-77 (1979).
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infringement.'" Failure by a party to prove direct infringement
necessarily results in the failure of any dependent indirect infringe-
ment claims (whether active inducement or contributory infringe-
ment),"8 though any underlying direct infringement can be proven
through circumstantial evidence. 9
In addition to showing that there was some direct infringement,
a plaintiff alleging active inducement must show some degree of
knowledge. "[A] person [actively induces infringement] by actively
and knowingly aiding and abetting another's direct infringement.
Although § 271(b) does not use the word 'knowing,' the case law and
legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement."' The con-
troversy at hand, however, is about what specific kind of knowledge
or intent is required.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT "SPLIT" IN ACTIVE INDUCEMENT
SCIENTER JURISPRUDENCE
To show active inducement, a plaintiff must prove that there were
instances of underlying direct infringement and that the defendant
had some degree of knowledge. Even within the Federal Circuit,
however, opinions have varied widely on what kind of knowledge a
plaintiff must show.2' Fundamentally, the court seems to be split on
whether a plaintiff must show general knowledge or intent-that is,
that the defendant knew and intended that a third party would
engage in the actions that constitute direct infringement-or
specific intent-that is, that the defendant knew and intended that
17. Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("It is well settled that there can be no inducement of infringement without direct
infringement by some party." (citing Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d
684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
18. See Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[E]vidence
of direct infringement ... is a prerequisite to indirect infringement.").
19. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("If
CBS is arguing that proof of inducing infringement or direct infringement requires direct, as
opposed to circumstantial evidence, we must disagree.").
20. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
21. This intracircuit split is particularly meaningful because the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district courts when original jurisdiction was
based in patent law. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000) (granting the
district courts original jurisdiction on patent cases exclusive of the state courts).
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a third party would engage in infringing actions. Different panels of
the Federal Circuit have ruled in mutually inconsistent fashion.22
Scholars and commentators have called these inconsistent rulings
in the Federal Circuit a split within the Circuit.2" Numerous district
courts have followed these seemingly divergent lines of cases, 24 and
recently the Federal Circuit has even explicitly acknowledged that
"there is a lack of clarity concerning whether the required intent [is]
merely to induce the specific acts or additionally to cause an
infringement."25 The Federal Circuit, it seems, has been content to
avoid "resolv[ing] [this] ambiguity" in a case if there is enough
evidence to show infringement under the stricter of the two
standards (intent to induce infringing actions)26 or if there is not
enough evidence to show infringement under even the broader
standard (intent to cause the acts that constitute infringement).27
All this ongoing and acknowledged confusion among the district
courts and within the Federal Circuit stems from two Federal
Circuit opinions issued three months apart in 1990, Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.2" and Manville Sales Corp. v.
Paramount Systems, Inc.29 To understand this apparent split-and
why there may not be a split at all-requires a deeper analysis of
each of these two cases.
22. Compare Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2004), and Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ("[The only intent required ... is the intent to cause the acts that constitute
infringement.") with Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Il]t must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent
to encourage another's infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the
acts alleged to constitute infringement." (quoting Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).
23. E.g., Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement To Infringe: Why the
Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(B), 10
FED. CIR. B.J. 299, 300 (2001); see John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible:
Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219,
228 (1998).
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
26. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
27. Mercexchange, L.L.C., v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated on
other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), remanded to Nos. 03-1600 to 03-1616.
28. 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (decided July 30, 1990).
29. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (decided Oct. 23, 1990).
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A. Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb
In Hewlett-Packard, plaintiff Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) was
the assignee of the "LaBarre" patent" "relat[ing] to X-Y plotters
used to create a two-dimensional plot, such as a chart or a graph, on
a sheet of paper."'" The LaBarre patent covered plotters that moved
paper through the use of grit-covered wheels.32 Bausch & Lomb
(B&L) was the assignee of another patent, the "Yeiser" patent,33
which described an X-Y plotter that moves paper back and forth
with pinch wheels that "have a surface with a high coefficient of
friction formed 'by knurling or by a layer of rubber or the like."'34
B&L sold plotters having grit-covered pinch wheels "sometime in
late 1982 or early 1983" through one of its divisions called Houston
Instruments.35 In September of 1985, B&L entered into an agree-
ment with Ametek, Inc. in which B&L sold the Houston Instru-
ments division to Ametek and B&L agreed, among other things, to
grant Ametek a license to the Yeiser patent, indemnify Ametek
against liability for infringing the LaBarre patent, and jointly work
with Ametek toward developing a plotter that would not infringe the
LaBarre patent.36
HP brought suit against B&L accusing B&L of direct infringe-
ment of the LaBarre patent for the time period prior to the sale of
Houston Instruments to Ametek and of § 271(b) active inducement
of infringement for the period subsequent to the sale of Houston
Instruments to Ametek. 37 B&L admitted that it directly infringed
the patents, but defended that the relevant claims of the LaBarre
30. U.S. Patent No. 4,384,298 (filed Mar. 16, 1982).
31. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1466.
32. Id. ("HP urges that the LaBarre printer should be considered to be a 'positive drive'
plotter, wherein the paper is drawn along using 'teeth' (i.e., the grit) which engage in 'holes'
(i.e., the indentations) in the paper ....").
33. U.S. Patent No. 31,684 (filed Nov. 15, 1982).
34. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1466. This was what HP urged the court to consider a
'"friction drive' plotter." Id.
35. Id. at 1467.
36. Id.
37. Id. B&L's sale of grit wheel plotters before Ametek bought Houston Instruments
would constitute direct infringement of the LaBarre patent. HP argued that the sale of all of
Houston Instruments' "assets, properties, rights and business" to Ametek constituted the
indirect infringement. Id.
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patent were invalid because they were obvious under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 in view of the Yeiser patent, for which they were properly
licensed."8 The court disposed of the obviousness issue, finding that
the LaBarre patent was not obvious in light of the Yeiser patent. 9
The court then considered whether B&L actively induced Ametek to
infringe the LaBarre patent by selling Ametek the Houston
Instruments division.4 °
After first distinguishing between active inducement under
§ 271(b) and contributory infringement under § 271(c), 41 the court
turned to "the question of what level of knowledge or intent is
required to find active inducement under § 271(b)."42 The court
recognized that § 271(b) does not explicitly include any knowledge
or intent requirement and is, on its face, possibly much broader
than § 271(c).4" The court, however, taking into account its view of
the meaning of "active inducement" in the relevant case law and
"the fact that § 271(b) was intended as merely a codification of pre-
1952 law," concluded that "proof of actual intent to cause the acts
which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to
finding active inducement."4
In this case, the court found that B&L lacked any intent to cause
the acts which constituted the infringement, instead characterizing
B&L's interest to be focused only on "divesting itself of Houston
Instruments at the highest possible price. B&L had no interest in
38. Id. Nonobviousness is often considered the ultimate test of patent validity. A useful
invention that is novel must also be nonobvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to
qualify for patent protection. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, ...
[obviousness] lends itself to several basic factual inquiries."). A full discussion of obviousness
is outside the scope of this Note. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 11, §§ 5.01-.06.
39. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1467-68. If the court had found the LaBarre patent
invalid due to obviousness, Ametek could not have directly infringed, so B&L could not
possibly be held liable for active inducement to infringe. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
40. See Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469-70.
41. Id. at 1469.
42. Id.
43. Id. Section 271(c), when discussing the sale of components of a patented invention,
requires a showing that the seller knows those components "to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
44. Hewlett.Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
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what Ametek did with Houston Instruments and certainly did not
care one way or the other whether Houston Instruments, under
Ametek's ownership, continued to make grit wheel plotters."45 Also
particularly noteworthy, the court held that the indemnification
clause in the agreement for the sale of Houston Instruments did not
constitute an active inducement to infringe.4"
B. Manville Sales v. Paramount Systems
In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,47 appellants
Paramount Systems, Robert S. Butterworth (Paramount's presi-
dent), and Anthony DiSimone (Paramount's corporate secretary)
appealed a district court's judgment finding Paramount liable for
direct infringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,847,333 (the '333 patent),
and finding Butterworth and DiSimone personally liable for direct
infringement and indirect infringement. 4 The '333 patent, assigned
to Manville, concerned an invention relating to very large light
fixtures, specifically "a new self-centering luminaire assembly design
capable of travelling readily up and down a pole, thereby providing
reliable accessibility for maintenance to the luminaires. '49
The self-centering luminaire assembly design described by the
'333 patent was invented by Manville's research manager, Robert
Zeller.5" Throughout 1971 and into 1972, Zeller engaged in ongoing
communications with Wyoming state officials that culminated in
the installation of this improved assembly in a light pole to be
installed in a rest area along a highway near Rawlins, Wyoming,
and included the sale of this new assembly."' By March of 1972,
Manville had approved these new assemblies for commercial use.52
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1470. The court did state, however, that an indemnification agreement like this
one could be evidence of intent to induce infringement if its "primary purpose [was] to
overcome the deterrent effect that the patent laws have on would-be infringers." Id. (citing
Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT.
OFF. SOCY 86, 150-51 (1971)).
47. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
48. Id. at 546-47, 549.
49. Id. at 547.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 547-48.
52. Id. at 548.
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A patent application was filed on February 5, 1973, and this
application later issued as the '333 patent.53
In 1984, DiSimone "obtained a copy of a drawing of Manville's
[improved self-centering assembly] device that had been submitted
to the Florida Department of Transportation" and sent this drawing
to Butterworth.54 Butterworth gave this drawing to a Paramount
designer for use in designing a similar self-centering assembly that
was later made and sold by Paramount.55 Manville filed its suit
against Paramount on July 14, 1986, alleging infringement of the
'333 patent and added DiSimone and Butterworth, personally, as
party-defendants on March 11, 1987.56 Paramount claimed as a
defense, among other theories, that the '333 patent was invalid due
to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)'s sale or public use statutory bar.57 The district
court concluded that the '333 patent was not invalid because
Manville's ongoing activities in Wyoming "constituted experimental
use.""8 The district court also held DiSimone and Butterworth
personally liable both for direct infringement and actively inducing
Paramount to infringe the '333 patent.59
53. Id. at 549.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides that "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent" so long
as he fulfills the other requirements of the patent act and "unless" one of a number of
conditions occurs. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). These conditions are commonly called "statutory
bars." 2 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 6.01. The statutory bar at issue in Manville denies patents
when "the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). A full discussion of
statutory bars is outside the scope of this Note. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 11, §§ 6.01-
.02.
58. Manville, 917 F.2d at 549. The experimental use doctrine is also outside the scope of
this Note but may be broadly described as the principle that experimental uses do not count
against an inventor as a statutory bar. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 6.02[7]. The
experimental use doctrine allows inventors to use their inventions in public without triggering
a statutory bar if a "public" location is the only place where proper experimentation can occur.
Id. This principle is comparatively ancient in the patent law. See City of Elizabeth v. Am.
Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) ("The use of an invention by the inventor
himself, or of any other person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to
bring the invention to perfection, has never been regarded as [a public use that would bar a
patent].").
59. Manville, 917 F.2d at 549.
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After affirming the district court's decision that the patent was
valid, finding that Manville's use was properly experimental and did
not trigger any statutory bars,6" and finding that Manville did not
engage in any inequitable conduct,61 the court turned to a discussion
of the personal liability of Butterworth and DiSimone, Paramount's
officers. 62 First, the court held that it was error to find Butterworth
and DiSimone personally liable for direct infringement, because
such liability required piercing the corporate veil, which was
inappropriate in this instance because "Paramount was not the alter
ego of the officers."63
As for the officers' personal liablility for actively inducing
Paramount to infringe the '333 patent, the court noted that § 271(b)
could subject "corporate officers who actively assist with their cor-
poration's infringement" to personal liability "regardless of whether
the circumstances are such that a court should disregard the
corporate entity and pierce the corporate veil."' By all accounts,
this reasoning is valid: active inducement applies to any person who
actively induces any other person-natural or otherwise-to
infringe a patent, holding the inducing party liable as if he were a
direct infringer.
The court noted that active inducement does require a showing
that "[t]he alleged infringer ... knowingly induced infringement."65
The court went further and described the complete standard for a
showing of active inducement to infringe:
It must be established that the defendant possessed specific
intent to encourage another's infringement and not merely that
the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute
inducement. The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
alleged infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he
knew or should have known his actions would induce actual
infringements.66
60. Id. at 549-51.
61. Id. at 551-52.
62. Id. at 552.
63. Id. at 552-53.
64. Id. at 553.
65. Id. (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see
also supra Part I.
66. Manville, 917 F.2d at 553 (first emphasis added).
20071 1475
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The court also reasoned by analogy to the laws of contributory
infringement, citing Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., the seminal § 271(c) contributory infringement
case, which held that contributory infringement liability requires a
showing that "the alleged contributory infringer knew that acts
would be infringing. 6 7 The Manville court concluded that the
district court had inappropriately held Butterworth and DiSimone
liable for active inducement to infringe, noting that "[t]here is
simply neither compelling evidence nor any findings that the
officers had specific intent to cause another to infringe."68
C. Controversy and the Progeny of Hewlett-Packard and Manville
in the District Courts and the Federal Circuit
Following these two Federal Circuit decisions, various district
courts and the Federal Circuit itself have explored the knowledge
requirement of§ 271(b) inducement in a number of cases. The active
inducement decisions since 1990 betray a general understanding
that there is an essential tension between the holdings in Hewlett-
Packard and Manville.69 Courts have either adopted a conception
of Hewlett-Packard requiring only a showing of "intent to cause
the acts that constitute infringement, '7' adopted the Manville view
requiring a showing of some manner of specific intent,7 or admitted
67. Id. (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,488 (1964)).
68. Id. at 554.
69. See, e.g., Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhere is a lack of clarity concerning whether the required intent must be merely
to induce the specific acts or additionally to cause an infringement."). The court cited
Manville, introducing the cite with a "see" signal, then cited Hewlett-Packard with a "but see"
signal. See id.
70. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see,
e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
CVIJBeta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 905 F. Supp. 1171, 1195-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd on
other grounds, 112 F.3d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
71. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Hilgraeve, Inc.
v. Symantec Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616-20 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Amersham Pharmacia
Biotech, Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., No. C 97-04203 CRB, 2000 WL 1897300, at **5-6. (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
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that there is a split and declined to answer the question for want of
need in the particular case because the result would be the same
regardless of which "standard" was applied.
This seeming lack of certainty in the active inducement standard
is undoubtedly frustrating to inventors, businesspeople, and patent
law practitioners alike. This uncertainty makes it very difficult for
actors to predict whether their actions will subject them to liability,
and the predictability and certainty of legal standards is undoubt-
edly one of the most fundamental goals of any reasonable system
of law.7" Stare decisis, in particular, is the mechanism by which
courts ensure some degree of consistency and uniformity in their
decisions.14 The Federal Circuit was established in 1982 with a
particular eye toward promoting uniformity in the patent law, in
recognition of the complex interweaving of technical fact and legal
analysis in patent law and the often conflicting precedent set by the
various courts of appeals.7 " In the last twenty years, however, the
Federal Circuit has often been regarded by patent practitioners as
infamously loose in its own approach to stare decisis.76
District courts are generally overworked and particularly under-
equipped to handle complicated issues of patent law.77 Presenting
district courts across the nation with two seemingly opposite
standards runs counter to the purpose of the Federal Circuit and
72. See, e.g., MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), remanded to Nos. 03-1600 to 03-
1616, 2006 WL 2036554 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 2006); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394
F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Insituform Tech., 385 F.3d at 1378.
73. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 699 (1998)
("People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming
against what is so much stronger than themselves .... The object of our study, then, is
prediction ... of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentally of the courts.").
74. See Matthew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-decisis: The Sometimes Rough
Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-making, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 791, 791 & n.4 (1998).
75. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2 (1981).
76. See Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 74, at 793 (stating that the court's exceptions are
'swallowing up the rule" and that its "treatment of its own precedent has become
unpredictable').
77. William C. Rocklidge & Matthew F. Weil, En Banc Review, Horror Pleni, and the
Resolution of Patent Law Conflicts, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 787, 803 (2000) ("[C]ases come
to the Federal Circuit straight from the harried and overworked district courts, many of which
lack particularized expertise in patent law ..... ).
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has already fostered much confusion, uncertainty, and doubt.78
What's more, the apparent division within the Federal Circuit itself
is particularly problematic. Circuit splits among the traditional
geographic circuits are troublesome enough, but at least provide
potential litigants with some sense of intracircuit certainty. Because
all patent appeals are heard by the Federal Circuit, there is a
nationwide uncertainty. Though the Supreme Court could grant
certiorari to resolve this dispute, it has so far declined to do so.v9 The
last time the Supreme Court heard a patent case concerning any
kind of indirect infringement at all was in 1964, when it addressed
contributory infringement under § 271 (c) in the Aro Manufacturing
cases.
8 0
These concerns about doctrinal splits are not merely academic
navel gazing. Those who hold patents wish to understand the scope
of their patents so that they can properly ensure the protection of
their inventions, and properly value the licensing of the same; those
who engage in business need to understand the scope of patents
they do not hold so that they can avoid active inducement liability;
and these business people and innovators both want to understand
the significance and protective value of opinion letters of counsel.
Finally, patent attorneys, of course, want to ensure that clients seek
their opinions on such matters.
78. See id. at 803-06 (detailing the interaction between the Federal Circuit bar and bench
and recognizing that en banc review is not a panacea for the Federal Circuit's difficulties with
stare decisis).
79. See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 543 (2005). The court in Metabolite required a showing of"actual
intent to cause the act which constitute the infringement." Id. at 1365. The U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari as to the question of what kind of intent is required under § 271(b).
See 126 S. Ct. 601 (mem.) (2005); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Metabolite Labs., 126 S. Ct.
543 (No. 04-607). Although certiorari was granted for one issue, unrelated to inducement, that
grant of certiorari was later dismissed as improvidently granted. See 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
80. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (Aro II); Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Aro 1); see also infra Part
III (discussing how some Supreme Court cases might be very illustrative for these doctrinal
elements of patent law, even though they are not patent cases).
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D. Why Hewlett-Packard and Manville Do Not Really Present a
"Split"At All
In all the preceding discussion and analysis, it has been taken for
granted that the holdings of Hewlett-Packard and Manville are
actually at odds. This Note posits that this is not so. Most courts
that have cited Hewlett-Packard for the assertion that active
inducement requires showing only "intent to cause the acts that
constitute infringement"'" forget two important things: first, that
the complete language of the Hewlett-Packard decision showed the
court to be "of the opinion that proof of actual intent to cause the
acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to
finding active inducement" 2 and, second, that in Hewlett-Packard,
the evidence did not show that Bausch & Lomb intended even that
Ametek itself commit the acts. 8
Understood in the proper context of the facts of the case, the court
in Hewlett-Packard did not inquire as to what particular kind of
intent and knowledge of infringing actions would be required for a
showing of active inducement liability because there was a complete
lack of intent to cause the acts. Judicial parsimony is an ancient and
well-regarded guiding principle in jurisprudence, and is certainly
appreciated by both practitioners and scholars.8 4 In this case, it
seems wise to read the Hewlett-Packard court's holding narrowly,
particularly when the court explicitly prefaces its statement with
the use of the "necessary prerequisite" language. 5 Some commenta-
tors have properly recognized an aspect of the Hewlett Packard case
that renders it able to be reconciled with Manville: the fact that the
81. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
82. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (emphasis added).
83. See id. at 1469-70 ("Looking at the totality of events surrounding the sale of Houston
Instruments, it is clear that B&L was merely interested in divesting itself of Houston
Instruments at the highest possible price. B&L had no interest in what Ametek did with
Houston Instruments and certainly did not care one way or the other whether Houston
Instruments, under Ametek's ownership, continued to make grit wheel plotters.").
84. See Gerald Lebovits, Short Judicial Opinions: The Weight of Authority, 76 N.Y. B. J.
64, 64 (Sept. 2004) (urging judges to avoid unnecessarily long opinions); see also WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 2, sc. 2 ("[B]revity is the
soul of wit."). But see Lebovits, supra, at 64 ("Judicial brevity is also no virtue when a court
decides too little ....").
85. Hewlett.Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469.
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plaintiffs did not present enough evidence to show even any intent
to induce the acts. 6 Those commentators, however, have drawn
errant conclusions.8 7
Manville, then, is far from Hewlett-Packard's Manichaean
opposite, and is more properly understood as continuing the active
inducement scienter analysis that was not required of the court
in Hewlett-Packard. Though there has been some criticism that
Manville's holding is a violation of stare decisis, 8 under the
aforementioned analysis of Hewlett-Packard's holding, this conclu-
sion cannot be the case. Though it is well established in the Federal
Circuit that "prior decisions are binding unless and until overturned
by the [c]ourt in banc,"s decisions are binding only if they com-
pletely address the same point of law.s° In Manville, there was an
appropriate showing that the corporate officers Butterworth and
DiSimone intended to induce the acts in question as they had
ordered the production of the new designs.9 Because the court found
intent to cause the acts themselves, it could not merely stop where
the Hewlett-Packard court had stopped; it required a further
analysis as to what sort of intent to cause infringement the officers
had. Requiring specific intent, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence to hold the officers liable under a theory of
active inducement to infringe.92
At least one district court seems to have taken exactly the same
approach to this seeming "split" as this Note advocates. In Applera
Corp. v. MJ Research, Inc.,93 the district court for the District of
86. See Rader, supra note 23, at 318 ("This holding is important, because it shows that the
standard set down by the Hewlett-Packard court for intent under § 271(b) is far from de
minimis.").
87. While Rader's point is true, it fails to put the court's holding in the proper context,
particularly in light of Hewlett-Packard's "necessary prerequisite" language.
88. See id. at 327-28 ("Not only did the panel in that case articulate a different rule from
that espoused by the Hewlett-Packard court, it actually considered and rejected the standard
set down in Hewlett-Packard.").
89. Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 74, at 792; see, e.g., Newell Co. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864
F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988); UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.6 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
90. See Weil & Rooklidge, supra note 74, at 792 n.7 ("[C]onflict [between Federal Circuit
cases] assumes that the holdings of the cases conflict, not just dicta ..... ).
91. Manville Sales Co. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549, 552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 554.
93. No. 3:98CV1201 (JBA), 2004 WL 350476 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2004).
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Connecticut ruled on plaintiff Applera's motion in limine to preclude
defendant MJ Research from
arguing at trial that MJ's inclusion of a disclaimer in advertising
and marketing materials for MJ's thermal cyclers negates any
intent to induce infringement and thereby absolves MJ of
liability for inducement of infringement, and to preclude
defendants and their witnesses from offering or making mention
of any PCR licensing notices or other disclaimers of liability as
a defense to plaintiffs' claims of inducement of infringement of
the PCR patents.94
As one versed in the apparent split would expect, the plaintiffs
argued that Moba95 and Hewlett-Packard6 both stand for the
proposition that only intent to cause the acts is necessary to hold
defendants liable and therefore that it is irrelevant "whether MJ
intended to encourage customers to obtain necessary authorizations
to avoid infringement of Applera's PCR patent rights."97 The
plaintiffs urged, 'MJ would have the requisite intent to cause the
acts ... and would therefore still be liable for any unauthorized
performance of PCR by its customers who did not understand or
heed its warning notice."98 Just as predictably, the defendants
argued that the Manville line of cases required showing intent to
cause infringement.99
The court soundly rejected the plaintiffs' arguments,"° noting
that the Manville line of cases cited by the defendants' acknowl-
edged no conflict,1"' that the court in Manville acknowledged no
conflict,"°2 and that the court in Manville indeed considered its
opinion as properly in line with the holding in Hewlett-Packard."°'
Dismissing the defendants' arguments that the Manville court
94. Id. at *1.
95. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
96. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
97. Applera, 2004 WL 350476, at *2.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at *3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. ("Manville Sales itself perceived no conflict with the earlier decided Hewlett-
Packard, citing it as partial support for its intent test.").
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violated the Federal Circuit's rules on stare decisis, the Applera
court then explicitly adopted the same view that this Note espouses:
The answer to the Hewlett-Packard/Manville Sales conun-
drum, if one exists, may lie in Hewlett-Packard's conclusion that
proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the
infringement is a "necessary prerequisite to finding active
inducement." Because the Hewlett-Packard decision found that
necessary threshold level of proof lacking, it did not have
occasion to explicate the full contours of what proof beyond that
prerequisite would be sufficient before liability can attach under
35 U.S.C. § 271(b). This explication was subsequently completed
by Manville Sales. This appears to be the way the Warner-
Lambert panel harmonized the two cases.
Thus, the appellate first-decided case rule is inapposite and
provides no basis for disregarding more recent Federal Circuit
decisions. Inasmuch as the Court is bound by the Manville Sales
precedent, it cannot consider plaintiffs' policy arguments
proposing deviating from it, and thus undertakes no examina-
tion of them."0 4
If a district court is able to recognize that this seeming split is not
really a split at all and can eloquently describe the resolution, there
is hope that the Federal Circuit can also issue so explicit an opinion.
It seems that a textual analysis of these two Federal Circuit
decisions is enough to show that they are not at odds and that there
need not be a "split" among the district courts and within the
Federal Circuit. Because some criticism of the holding in Manville
extends to its substance and to the policy underlying the stan-
dard,1 °5 this Note will show in Part III that the Supreme Court
would likely agree with the holding of the Manville court and in
Part IV that the Manville holding, far from being disruptive,
comports with the existing common law, the legislative intent
behind the Patent Act, and the policy goals of the patent system.
104. Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted).
105. See Rader, supra note 23, at 329-33 (arguing that "substantive policy considerations
favor the Hewlett-Packard standard").
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III. METRO GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS V. GROKSTER: SECONDARY
LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT PROVIDING A WINDOW INTO THE SUPREME
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF ACTIVE INDUCEMENT
Though the Supreme Court has not addressed any indirect
infringement topic in a patent case since 1964,16 two of the most
significant cases in the entire realm of intellectual property law that
the Supreme Court has decided in the last twenty-five years
concerned indirect infringement as described by the patent law,
even though the substance of the cases was copyright law. Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. °7 and Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.18 both involved the
explicit adoption of an aspect of indirect liability from patent law
into the copyright law. In Sony, the Supreme Court adopted from
§ 271(c) jurisprudence the "staple article of commerce" defense to
charges of contributory infringement °9 and in Grokster, the Court
explicitly adopted § 271(b)'s active inducement standard."'
The controversy in Sony surrounded the sale of Sony's Betamax
video tape recorders (VTRs), specifically whether their sale, which
would enable consumers to record television programs, violated
Universal's rights under the Copyright Act."' The Supreme Court
adopted patent law's § 271(c) standard for contributory infringement
and found that Sony's VTRs were staple articles of commerce with
"substantial non-infringing uses" and, therefore, Sony was not liable
for contributory copyright infringement. 12 Although there was no
precedent in the copyright law for attributing liability for contribu-
tory infringement, the Supreme Court in Sony adopted the stan-
dards of § 271(c) from the patent law by "analogy," finding it
"appropriate to refer [to patent law cases] because of the historic
kinship between patent law and copyright law.""' 3 Though the Court
106. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (Aro II); Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (Aro 1). The Aro cases
concerned a theory of contributory infringement liability under § 271(c).
107. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
108. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
109. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
110. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
111. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
112. Id. at 456.
113. Id. at 439.
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recognized that the specific development of common law secondary
liability was not exactly identical in copyright and in patent, 114 and
recognized that "[t]he two areas of the law, naturally, are not
identical twins,""' 5 the Court noted that "in both areas the contribu-
tory infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition that
adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look
beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the products
or activities that make such duplication possible." '16
The Sony Court also noted that there was a long history of
borrowing of doctrinal principles between the patent law and the
copyright law when courts recognized "basic similarities between
copyrights and patents."' 7 The Court in Sony adopted § 271(c) from
the patent law into the copyright law, and in so doing, it provided
some clarification on how properly to interpret the terms of that
section.1' 8 Indeed, Sony has become the landmark case on contribu-
tory infringement and is, along with the Aro cases, the authoritative
reading of § 271(c), even though it is not a patent case at all." 9
When the Ninth Circuit decided Grokster,"2 ° its analysis revolved
almost entirely around an analysis of the Sony conception of
114. Secondary liability in copyright not originating from the patent law is outside the
scope of this Note. For an extremely thorough analysis of secondary liability in copyright at
the time just before the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster, see Craig A. Grossman, The
Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability and Contributory Infringement: From Interstitial Gap
Filler to Arbiter of the Content Wars, 58 SMU L. REv. 357 (2005). See also Craig A. Grossman,
From Sony to Grokster, the Failure of the Copyright Doctrines of Contributory Infringement
and Vicarious Liability To Resolve the War Between Content and Destructive Technologies, 53
BUFF. L. REv. 141 (2005).
115. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19.
116. Id. at 442.
117. Id. at 439 n.19; see, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948) (holding that block-booking of copyrighted films constituted an inequitable attempt to
extend the monopoly granted by copyright in a manner analogous to the patent misuse
doctrine); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932) (holding that taxes on royalties
from copyright, like taxes on royalties from patents, are legitimate); Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657-58 (1834) (discussing the shared policies that underlie both copyright
and patent at common law).
118. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 441-42.
119. See Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1275 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (referring to Sony as the "clearest articulation" of a particular facet of contributory
infringement under § 271(c) to show error in Dynacore's argument).
120. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
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contributory infringement.121 Before the Supreme Court released
its opinion in Grokster, many commentators and scholars were
convinced that the decision would seriously change the Sony
framework for contributory infringement.'22 In actuality, the Sony
conception of contributory infringement was scarcely affected, at
least by the majority opinion."2 In fact, the Court noted that the
Ninth Circuit erred when it read the "staple article of commerce
with substantial noninfringing uses" defense to contributory in-
fringement as a total bar to all theories of infringement,'24 but then
decided "to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day
when that may be required."'25 Jonathan Zittrain, codirector of the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
and coauthor of an amicus brief in support of Grokster, noted that
"Sony emerges not in tatters.'2 6
What was significant, of course, was that the Supreme Court
explicitly adopted the patent law's active inducement liability under
§ 271(b) into the copyright law.'27 In light of this recent borrowing
in active inducement law and the Supreme Court's recognition of a
historical kinship between patent and copyright law, it is important
121. See id. at 1160 ("Any examination of contributory copyright infringement must be
guided by the seminal case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.").
122. E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Faculty in Support of Respondents, at *2,
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480) ('The brief is concerned solely with the scope of
the 'staple-article-of-commerce' defense articulated in Sony. Specifically, amici contend that
the Sony standard has proven to be an effective means of balancing the interests of copyright
owners with the equally important need to preserve incentives for technological innovation-
and thus that the Court should not now modify the standard.").
123. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79 (stating that the Ninth Circuit read Sony too broadly
and declining to revisit Sony's holding); see also id. at 2790-96 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(arguing that Sony should remain unchanged, not be interpreted more loosely, as MGM urged,
or more strictly, as Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, in Breyer's view, urged); id. at 2783-87
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit misread Sony when it granted
summary judgment to defendants based on "evidence insufficient to demonstrate, beyond
genuine debate, a reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially significant non-
infringing uses were likely to develop over time" and that Justice Breyer misread Sony as
allowing contributing infringement liability "only when the product 'will be used almost
exclusively to infringe copyrights"' (citing id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring)) (first emphasis
added)).
124. See id. at 2778 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 2779.
126. See Tom Zeller Jr., Trying To Tame an Unruly Technology: Music Swapping Is Likely
To Pause but Not Wither, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at C1 (quoting Zittrain).
127. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
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to understand how the Grokster Court interpreted the knowledge
and intent requirements of "active inducement" in copyright law.
That interpretation will provide a valuable window into how the
Supreme Court understands the term "active inducement" and how
it might rule should an active inducement patent case reach its
docket. Some attention to the Grokster Court's legal analysis, then,
is warranted.
Grokster and codefendant StreamCast Networks, Inc., were
software companies that distributed software products that allowed
users to share computer files through peer-to-peer networks.128 After
disposing of Grokster's claim that the Sony doctrine provided a
complete defense to claims of any indirect infringement, 129 the Court
noted that
Sony's rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law
from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But
nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if
there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to fore-
close rules of fault-based liability derived from the common
law. 13
0
The Court then recounted some of the comparatively ancient case
law concerning inducement theories of indirect liability in copyright
and patent contexts, including two of the seminal pre-1952 Patent
Act cases that concerned inducing patent infringement:13' Thomson-
Houston Electric Co. v. Kelsey Electric Railway Specialty Co.' 32 and
Rumford Chemical Works v. Hecker.133
The Court then noted that "[e]vidence of 'active steps ... taken to
encourage direct infringement' ... show an affirmative intent that
the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement
was encouraged overcomes the law's reluctance to find liability"
when a defendant does not engage in behavior that constitutes
128. Id. at 2770.
129. Id. at 2774-79.
130. Id. at 2779.
131. Id.
132. 75 F. 1005 (2d Cir. 1896).
133. 20 F. Cas. 1342 (C.C.D.N.J. 1876) (No. 12,133).
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direct infringement." The Court cited Water Technologies Corp. v.
Calco, Ltd. '35 approvingly when noting that liability for inducement
was appropriate where one "actively and knowingly aid[s] and
abet[s] another's direct infringement.136
The way that the Court used these cases seemed to endorse a
specific intent requirement for a showing of active inducement
to infringe, but the absence of any citation to Hewlett-Packard,
Manville, or any of the successor cases in either line is surprising.
The Court did, however, cite to Haworth Inc. v. Herman Miller
Inc.,37 a comparatively obscure district court case from the Western
District of Michigan. 3 ' This case concerned patents for "electrically-
wired, reconfigurable wall systems" for dividing offices into
individual work spaces.139 The Haworth court was very clear in its
view on what sort of knowledge or intent is required for a showing
of active inducement under § 271(b): "To make its case for active
inducement to infringe, Haworth has a burden of production to show
(1) direct infringement by a third party, and (2) that HMI purposely
caused, urged or encouraged that third party to infringe, with the
knowledge that he or she would infringe."'4 ° The Supreme Court's
conception of active inducement then, at least in Grokster, required
a showing of specific intent to induce acts that constitute infringe-
ment with specific knowledge that those acts constitute infringe-
ment. Although the Court did not specifically cite Manville or any
of its line of cases (and, curiously, even this obscure Haworth case
did not cite Manville), this view of active inducement is entirely
consistent with Manville.
134. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
135. 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
136. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting Water Techs. Corp., 850 F.2d at 668) (alterations
in original).
137. No. 1:92:CV:877, 1994 WL 875931 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 1994).
138. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. In fact, according to Westlaw's KeyCite, the Supreme
Court in Grokster is the only court to have cited this unreported opinion at all.
139. Haworth, 1994 WL 875931, at *1.
140. Id. at *10. Although the Supreme Court did not quote this particular passage, see
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780, it did cite Haworth in a list of cases laying out "[t]he rule on
inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases [which] is no different today." Id.
at 2779. Given Haworth's obscurity, see supra note 138, this citation suggests that the Court
shares Haworth's conception of inducement to infringe.
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The Supreme Court spent the remainder of its Grokster analysis
exploring whether there was sufficient evidence on record to find
that Grokster possessed the specific intent to induce infringement."'
Specifically, the Court saw "[t]he only apparent question about
treating MGM's evidence as sufficient to withstand summary
judgment under the theory of inducement goes to the need on
MGM's part to adduce evidence that StreamCast and Grokster
communicated an inducing message to, their software users."'42
Throughout the rest of the opinion, the Supreme Court held that
MGM's evidence was sufficient to support such a finding.'43 To a
student of active inducement in patent law, this finding is not
particularly surprising, because it is already well established that
the requisite intent can be proven through the use of circumstantial
evidence."4
This analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster
provides further evidence to suggest that the Manville standard
would be most appropriate. Even though the Supreme Court has not
ruled on an indirect liability patent case since 1964, in adopting the
active inducement standard from patent law into the copyright law,
the Court necessarily had to explore the metes and bounds of active
inducement. The Court's holding in Grokster is in line with the
holding in Manville and draws upon the same common law princi-
ples.
IV. WHY THE MANVILLE STANDARD SHOULD BE-AND ALREADY
HAS BEEN-ADOPTED
A. The Manville Standard Comports with the Intent of the Patent
Act, with the Common Law from Which Active Inducement
Springs, and with the Federal Circuit's Nonpatent Aiding and
Abetting Jurisprudence
Perhaps the most effortless manner in which one can suggest that
the Manville standard should be adopted by the Federal Circuit is
to emphasize that it already has been adopted by the Federal
141. See Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2780-83.
142. Id. at 2780.
143. Id. at 2781-83.
144. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Circuit. Given the proper reading, the Manville decision does not
conflict with the holding in Hewlett-Packard.'45 Because such an
interpretation presents no conflict between the two holdings, it
clarifies that the Federal Circuit's rules on stare decisis"' are not
violated and there is not a schism at all. For some, however, "mere"
inertia is an insufficiently convincing reason to be satisfied with a
standard, particularly when there are criticisms of the standard
itself.147
To further assuage those concerned with the Manville standard,
it is worth mentioning that the Manville standard comports well
with the underlying sources of law, authority, and legislative intent
behind § 271. The early case law regarding "contributory infringe-
ment"' characterized indirect infringement-particularly of the ilk
now called active inducement-as "concert of action" or aiding and
abetting.'49 Section 271 of the 1952 Patent Act was intended to
codify the existing common law theories of indirect liability and to
resolve some confusion among the courts. 150 Section 271(b), in
particular, was intended to "recite[] in broad terms that one who
aids and abets an infringement is likewise an infringer.' ' 51
Common law tort principles of aiding and abetting have generally
recognized that aiding and abetting liability in an inducement-
related context requires a showing of specific knowledge of the
wrongfulness of the underlying, induced act. A relevant portion of
section 877(a) of the Second Restatement of Torts reads: "For harm
resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one
is subject to liability if he ... orders or induces the conduct, if he
knows or should know of circumstances that would make the
145. See supra Part IID.
146. See, e.g., Newell Co. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988); UMC
Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
147. See Rader, supra note 23, at 329.
148. Recall that the term "contributory infringement," at the time, comprised both of the
modern concepts of active inducement and contributory infringement, codified as § 271(b) and
§ 271(c), respectively.
149. See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005, 1008 (2d
Cir. 1896); Rumford Chem. Works v. Hecker, 20 F. Cas. 1342, 1346 (C.C.D.N.J. 1876) (No.
12,113).
150. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 9 (1952).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
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conduct tortious if it were his own .... ,15' At least one commentator
has suggested that, in lieu of the relatively ancient view of indirect
infringement as aiding and abetting, a more modern approach
suggests that indirect patent infringement "is analogous to a
tortious interference with economic relations."1"3 Even under such
a view, however, an interference with economic relations or pro-
spective advantage has always required "malice" and a showing of
specific intent not only to induce acts, but to induce wrongful (or
infringing) acts.1 4
Another strong source of support for this assertion-that the
common law principles underlying inducement law support the
specific intent requirement that Manville espouses-is, interestingly
enough, the Federal Circuit itself. This support comes from the
Federal Circuit's nonpatent jurisprudence as expressed in United
States v. Hitachi America, Ltd.,15 a customs case. The Court of
International Trade found Hitachi America liable for negligent
misreporting of duties that it was required to properly report under
19 U.S.C. §§ 1481 and 1485."6 The Court of International Trade
found Hitachi Japan separately and fully liable for the same penalty
for aiding and abetting Hitachi America's negligent violations.157
Hitachi Japan cross-appealed on the ground that a finding of lia-
bility on a theory of aiding and abetting "require[d] intent which,
it was clear, was not shown here."'58
Before the Federal Circuit, then, was an issue of whether aiding
and abetting required specific intent of the wrongfulness of the
underlying acts. In other words, the Federal Circuit was asked to
answer a question that was entirely analogous to the central
question in a finding of active inducement in Hewlett-Packard,
Manville, and the successor cases. Replace "aiding and abetting"
with "active inducement to infringe a patent," and the situations
are identical. Here, the Federal Circuit noted that the Court of
International Trade "resorted to interpreting and analogizing the
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) (1979).
153. Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53
J. PAT. OFF. SoclY 86, 92 n.14 (1971).
154. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 124 (3d ed. 1964).
155. 172 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
156. Id. at 1322, 1324-25.
157. Id. at 1322.
158. Id. at 1322-23.
1490 [Vol. 48:1465
WHICH INTENTIONS PAVE THE ROAD
Restatement of Torts to conclude that a party could unintentionally
aid or abet a negligent violation of the customs laws."'59 The Federal
Circuit was not convinced, noting that the Restatement was not
binding authority, 6 ' and that, even "under a straightforward in-
terpretation of the pertinent language, the Restatement itself
requires knowledge that the underlying act is tortious.''
The court then went on to note that "legal authority in various
civil and criminal contexts supports the view that liability for aiding
or abetting requires, inter alia, proof of knowledge of unlawfulness,
also articulated as intent to violate the law." '162
The Manville standard, beyond already actually being the law,
should be explicitly and unreservedly adopted. It comports with the
Federal Circuit's explicit jurisprudence on active inducement to
infringe patents, comports with the common law principles underly-
ing the Patent Act, comports with the legislative history underlying
the Patent Act, would unify the Federal Circuit's patent and
nonpatent aiding and abetting jurisprudence, and seems to have
support in the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster.
B. Criticisms of the Manville Standard Are Not Insurmountable
Though this Note has shown that the Manville standard is
actually the law and binding precedent on the Federal Circuit, there
are some commentators who believe that substantive policy
concerns favor their interpretation of the "strong" Hewlett-Packard
standard-that is, a standard for active inducement that requires
showing only that the defendant intended to cause the acts which
constituted infringement.'63 The Manville standard is not only
159. Id. at 1337.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Id. As authority in nonpatent civil contexts, the court cited Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal
Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258, 270 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that civil RICO actions require
showing knowledge of the unlawful act and intent to facilitate it) and Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that aiding and abetting
in a securities context requires showing defendant "knowingly and substantially assisted the
violation"). From a criminal context, the court cited United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d
1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990). The court even cited to its own opinion in National Presto
Industries, Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1195 (Fed Cir. 1996), to show that aiding and
abetting in a patent context required knowingly aiding and abetting infringement.
163. See, e.g., Rader, supra note 23, at 329.
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already the law, but it is also substantively "worthy" of being the
law, and it is important to address some of its criticisms. Michael
Rader, in particular, raises some valid concerns about some possible
negative consequences of the Manville standard.
Rader suggests the Manville standard requiring specific intent to
induce infringement would enable "alleged inducers to escape
liability by obtaining a noninfringement opinion from counsel, as
suggested in Manville Sales, ... result[ing] in highly uneven patent
protection across different industries" and enabling "a would-be
inducer to forge ahead with ... harmful activity, by having it rubber-
stamped by an outside law firm."'64 On this particular point, it
seems that Mr. Rader makes an error substantially similar in kind
to the error the Ninth Circuit made in its Grokster decision with its
interpretation of the Sony doctrine. That is, just as the Supreme
Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding the presence of
some "substantial noninfringing uses" served as a total bar to all
forms of liability,165 it seems that Rader improperly assumes that all
opinions from counsel would serve as a total bar to a finding of
actual knowledge or actual intent. The solicitation of legal opinions
from counsel is absolutely vital to giving business people and
inventors, who are almost overwhelmingly not particularly well-
versed in the law of patents, a better sense of the risks they face.'66
But it is vital to note that, although soliciting opinions from counsel
may serve as evidence of intent to avoid infringement, it cannot
mask or counteract evidence of actual knowledge of or intent to
induce infringement.
Rader also suggests that another "reason to prefer the Hewlett-
Packard standard is that it limits the opportunistic behavior of
would-be inducers by giving patentees the power to compel settle-
ment by forcing corporate officers to face the prospect of personal
164. Id. at 330-32.
165. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005).
166. Soliciting such opinions is helpful operationally in a general business context for
generating business development plans and avoiding liability. Because the scope of indirect
liability can be so broad, business people often must seek the advice of competent counsel.
Reliance on advice of competent counsel is recognized as a defense to a charge of willful direct
infringement. See David 0. Taylor, Wasting Resources: Reinventing the Scope of Waiver
Resulting from the Advice-of-Counsel Defense to a Charge of Willful Patent Infringement, 12
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 319, 325-26 (2004).
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liability."'67 This particular point seems to be a non-sequitor,
because nothing in the Manville standard precludes finding officers
directly liable for actively inducing their corporations to infringe a
patent. 6 ' A plaintiff that seeks to hold corporate officers personally
liable must merely show the requisite intent to induce the infringe-
ment.
Combining the threat of using § 271(b) inducement law to levy
personal liability on corporate officers for the actions of their
corporations with the lax intent standard that Rader and others
have advocated is also particularly troublesome. Corporate officers
are traditionally liable for corporate actions only when the veil
surrounding the corporate form has been properly pierced. The
Federal Circuit recognized that corporate officers can be liable for
actively inducing their corporations to infringe patents under
§ 271(b), and that such a finding does not require the traditional
corporate piercing analysis.'69 Adopting Rader's more lax § 271(b)
inducement intent standard, however, would expose every corporate
officer whose corporation has engaged in direct infringement to
personal liability under a theory of indirect infringement. This
would be unreasonably broad. 7 °
Furthermore, under the Manville standard, traditional veil
piercing analysis is not made irrelevant. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc.,'" is one case in which the traditional under-
standing of corporate veil piercing was not affected by countervail-
ing understandings of § 271(b)'s intent requirement. In that case,
167. Rader, supra note 23, at 332. Again, Rader's use of "Hewlett-Packard' is understood
to mean the "strong' view of the Hewlett-Packard standard, not this Note's understanding of
the Hewlett-Packard "standard."
168. Manville was itself concerned with personal liability of officers and the standard
promulgated in the court's holding did not suggest that merely seeking advice of counsel
provides a per se bar against a finding of inducement. See supra notes 60-68 and
accompanying text.
169. Power Lift, Inc. v. Lang Tools, Inc., 774 F.2d 478, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
170. Some commentators read this situation even less charitably, suggesting that smaller
companies are more particularly put at risk by such an interpretation. See Kevin Flannery
& Gary Levin, Personal Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement by Their
Corporations, 65 PA. B. ASS'N. Q. 33, 34 (1994). Flannery and Levin note that a properly
understood intent standard would help mitigate these concerns. They cite Manville both as
such a standard and also as expressing their understanding of the then-current state of law.
Id.
171. 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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plaintiffs sought to hold directors of a corporation personally liable
for direct infringement of a patent under § 271(a).172 The court in
Orthokinetics went through a similar analysis as it had employed in
Manville, but unlike in Manville, it did find that the corporate veil
was properly pierced because the evidence established that STC and
Entron, the defendant corporations, were closely held corporations
and were functioning as alter-egos of the relevant directors.
173
Though the court noted that, in situations in which corporate
directors are found liable on a theory of active inducement under
§ 271(b), personal liability does not depend on piercing the corporate
veil, the court in this case only reviewed the district court's decision
on the issue of direct infringement under § 271(a). 174 In cases of
direct infringement, then, the protection of the corporate veil
remains robust.
Criticisms of the Manville standard are legitimate, but largely of
academic concern because, barring a future Federal Circuit en banc
hearing or a Supreme Court decision overturning Manville, it is the
law. Even when addressed head on, these criticisms do not prove to
be insurmountable. Moreover, the Manville standard strengthens
businesspeoples' understanding of the scope of liability and helps
prevent that scope from being overly and impossibly broad.
175
CONCLUSION
Scholars and courts alike perceive a "split" in the Federal
Circuit's understanding of what sort of knowledge or intent is
required for one to have actively induced patent infringement under
§ 271(b). The creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 was intended
to provide for a more consistent patent jurisprudence, but on this
particular issue, scholars have asserted that "the case law has not
sparkled with clarity regarding precisely what the level of intent
should be,"'76 and even the Federal Circuit has claimed that "'there
172. Id. at 1567.
173. See id. at 1579.
174. Id. at 1578-79.
175. But see Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 225
(2005). Lemley suggests that the law of active inducement would benefit most from a stepped-
scale balancing approach in which the required showing of intent or knowledge varies
inversely with the "directness" of an infringer's conduct. See id. at 242-45.
176. Thomas, supra note 23, at 228.
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is a lack of clarity concerning whether the required intent must be
merely to induce the specific acts [of infringement] or additionally
to cause an infringement.""77 This confusion is compounded by the
Federal Circuit's sometimes confusing approach to stare decisis and
by the long period of time since the Supreme Court has heard a
patent indirect infringement case.
This "split," however, is not a split at all. Much of the confusion,
in both the scholarly community and the courts, stems from a
misunderstanding of the holdings of Hewlett-Packard and Manville.
Far from being an example of the Federal Circuit's purported
inconsistencies, these two decisions are complementary in nature.
While some subsequent opinions in the district courts and even in
the Federal Circuit have considered two distinct standards and
chosen one, or expressed doubt about the state of the jurisprudence,
any multiplicity of standards is illusory. The Manville standard
should be and, in fact, already is the proper scienter standard for
active inducement under § 271(b); proper interpretation of the
Federal Circuit's holdings in Hewlett-Packard and Manville,
particularly in light of the Federal Circuit's rules on stare decisis,
shows that concern about a "split" is unfounded.
Explicitly adopting this standard also comports well with other
authoritative indicators. The Supreme Court's recent Grokster
decision on copyright law explicitly adopted the active inducement
standard from the patent law, and the Court's interpretation of
active inducement in that case is consistent with the Manville
standard. This understanding can properly be applied to the patent
law because of the rich history of interconnected developments in
secondary liability in patent and copyright law. The common law
and legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act also suggest that the
Manville standard is proper.
Though some scholars have expressed concerns about the
ramifications of adopting such a standard, their concerns are not
insurmountable. Adopting the Manville standard will restore much-
needed confidence in the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence, provide
patentees with a better understanding of the scope of their granted
177. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), remanded to Nos. 03-1600 to 03-
1616 (alteration in original)).
2007] 1495
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
privilege, help clarify the role of counsel's opinions, and provide
innovators with a better understanding of how to avoid inducing
patent infringement.
Tal Kedem*
* This Note is dedicated to my family, without whose love I would not be who I am, and
without whose support I could not do what I do.
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